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Introduction
The New York State Board of Regents and Commis-
sioner of Education have identified a set of clear perfor-
mance standards for students in New York State. These
standards represent the knowledge and skills students
are expected to need in order to function successfully as
productive citizens in the 21st century. These standards
will be implemented through new “high-stakes” Re-
gents examinations, which all students will be required
to pass to graduate from high school, and supported by
new examinations in the fourth and eighth grades, which
will serve as important intermediate checkpoints in as-
sessing student progress.
New York is not alone in setting higher standards for its
students. Over the last decade, many states have imple-
mented higher standards, and by 2004, almost half the
states will require passage of exit exams for high school
graduation (Meyer et al. 2002). Although this movement
toward higher standards is driven primarily by state edu-
cation departments and state elected officials, it has other
roots as well. State courts often interpret the education
clauses in their state constitutions as obligating the state to
ensure that all children have the opportunity to reach an
adequate level of content knowledge and skill (Lukemeyer
2003). New York’s school finance system, for example,
has been challenged in state court as unconstitutional
because it does not provide a “sound basic education.”1
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1 New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, has interpreted article XI, section 1, of the state constitution as requiring the legislature
to “ensure the availability of a sound basic education to all the children of the State.” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d 661
[“CFE1”] at 665; Board of Education v. Nyquist (1982). The two most recent decisions in the ongoing litigation include Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (2001) (“CFE2”), and Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130 (2002) (“CFE3”). In CFE2, the trial court
found the system unconstitutional, but New York’s intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision in CFE3. The case has
been appealed to New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals.
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Moreover, the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
requires states to implement annual testing from third
through eighth grade as part of a broader accountabil-
ity system that includes school report cards and state-
set minimum performance standards (Robelen 2002).
Despite the clear trend toward higher standards in edu-
cation, states have been slow to implement funding sys-
tems designed specifically to help students (and schools)
reach new standards (Boser 2001). The objective of this
paper is to provide state governments with tools to help
them develop a school finance system that supports stu-
dents and school districts trying to reach higher perfor-
mance standards. The paper focuses on
a well-known problem, namely, that
schools with disadvantaged students
must spend more than other schools
to meet any given standard. This pa-
per shows how to estimate each district’s
cost for achieving an adequacy standard
and develops a foundation aid formula
that adjusts for the higher costs in some
districts.
The development of any adequacy-
based school finance system involves
three components, which correspond
to the three substantive sections of
this paper:
First, a state must select measures of adequacy, either in
terms of resources or student performance. Such mea-
sures are necessary to identify school districts below the
standard. Although these measures can be controversial
and difficult to develop, this choice is unavoidable.
Second, a state must estimate the cost of reaching a
given performance standard in each district. The cost
function approach presented in this study relies on
statistical methods to extract from actual data the
impact of student needs, resource prices, and enroll-
ment size on the spending required to reach a par-
ticular standard.
Third, a state must develop a school aid formula. This
formula should provide all school districts the resources
they need to reach the adequacy standard selected by
the state.
This paper explains how each of these steps can be
implemented, with illustrations based on data from
New York State.2 Our objective is to provide guidance
for any state that wants to design an adequacy-based
finance system.
Developing an Adequacy Standard
In setting an adequacy standard, a state must first de-
cide whether the standard is intended to guarantee
each district some minimum level of
resources or to give all students the
opportunity to reach a minimum
level of student performance. A re-
source standard is typically repre-
sented in terms of a bundle of re-
sources and course requirements that
represent an opportunity for an ad-
equate education. In contrast, a per-
formance standard usually is expressed
as a level of student performance on
standardized exams. One set of ex-
aminations is unlikely to capture all
dimensions of an adequate education,
as defined by the courts or the gen-
eral public; nevertheless, many states
are setting adequacy standards by making the passage
of specific tests either an objective or a graduation re-
quirement.
In New York State, the debate over performance stan-
dards has not yet been resolved. Both the Board of
Regents and Commissioner of Education have identi-
fied a clear set of performance requirements for stu-
dents to graduate from high school. However, the
courts have not yet identified the standards required
by the New York State Constitution.
In a 1995 decision, New York’s highest court defined
the constitutional requirement that the state provide
a “sound basic education” in terms of both student
performance (knowledge and skills necessary to vote
and serve on a jury) and resources (minimally adequate
2 A more detailed discussion of data and methods used in this paper is available in Duncombe (2002), particularly appendix A (data sources
and measures) and appendix B (statistical models and methods).
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facilities, material, and teaching).3 In later decisions,
however, lower courts have differed as to the level of
student performance that this definition requires. In
January 2001, the trial court ruled that “a capable and
productive citizen . . . is capable of serving impartially
on trials that may require learning unfamiliar facts and
concepts and . . . decid[ing] complex matters that re-
quire . . . verbal, reasoning, math, science, and social-
ization skills. . . .” (CFE2 at 485) This implies that
high school graduation from a reasonably demanding
program is a requirement for productive citizenship.
In contrast, in June 2002, an intermediate appellate
court ruled that “The State submitted evidence that
jury charges are generally at a grade level of 8.3, and
newspaper articles on campaign and ballot issues range
from grade level 6.5 to 11.7. . . . Thus, the evidence at
trial established that the skills required to enable a
person to obtain employment, vote, and serve on a
jury, are imparted between grades 8 and 9, a level of
skills which the plaintiffs do not dispute is being pro-
vided.” (CFE3 at 138) In other words, this court ruled
that high school graduation is not mandatory for meet-
ing the constitutional standard.
While translating these court decisions into specific per-
formance measures is beyond the scope of this paper, it is
clear that the level of student performance associated with
“productive citizenship” as defined by the courts will have
a large impact on the school finance system. In selecting
a measure of performance to use in estimating the cost
of adequacy, we have drawn from the measures devel-
oped by the New York State Education Department
(SED). First, we average math and English exam scores
in fourth grade, eighth grade, and high school. The mea-
sure used in this study is based on a weighted average of
fourth- and eighth-grade exam scores, and high school
Regents exam scores. Regents exam scores were weighted
twice as heavily as fourth- and eighth-grade exam scores
to reflect the fact that students are now required to pass
these exams for high school graduation.4 The resulting
composite test scores can range from 0 to 200.
For comparison purposes, we are going to look at the
costs associated with two standards, 130 and 160. A
standard of 130 might be consistent with the third
CFE decision (CFE3), because it implies adequate per-
formance for all fourth- and eighth-grade students, but
3 The Court of Appeals stated:
Such an education should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually
function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury. If the physical facilities and pedagogical services
and resources made available under the present system are adequate to provide children with the opportunity to obtain these
essential skills, the State will have satisfied its constitutional obligation. As we stated in Levittown,
The Legislature has made prescriptions (or in some instances provided means by which prescriptions may be made) with
reference to the minimum number of days of school attendance, required courses, textbooks, qualifications of teachers and
of certain nonteaching personnel, pupil transportation, and other matters. If what is made available by this system (which
is what is to be maintained and supported) may properly be said to constitute an education, the constitutional mandate is
satisfied. (57 N.Y.2d, at 48.)
The State must assure that some essentials are provided. Children are entitled to minimally adequate physical facilities and
classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn. Children should have access to minimally
adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks. Children are also entitled
to minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social
studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas.
(CFE1 at 666 [footnote omitted])
4 Newly developed examinations in mathematics and English language arts are required of all fourth- and eighth-grade students. SED has
divided test results into four levels and reports the counts (and percent) of students reaching a given level. The levels are selected to reflect
students with “serious academic deficiencies” (level 1), students needing “extra help to meet the standards and pass the Regents
examinations” (level 2), students meeting “the standards and with continued steady growth, should pass the Regents examinations” (level
3), and students exceeding “the standards and are moving toward high performance on the Regents examination” (level 4). The percent
of students reaching each level is first identified, and then a weighted average of these percents is calculated with a weight of 1 for level
2 and a weight of 2 for levels 3 and 4. With relatively few exceptions (e.g., severe disabilities), all students will have to pass a series of
Regents examinations to receive a regular high school diploma. A similar process is used to aggregate results for the Regents examinations.
The percent of students receiving between 55 and 64 on the Regents exams in math and English are given a weight of 1, and the percent
of students receiving above a 64 are weighted at 2. Performance in high school is a more accurate reflection of the accumulated knowledge
and skills of students than performance in earlier grades. Thus, a weight of 50 percent is applied to the Regents exams, 25 percent to
fourth-grade exams, and 25 percent to eighth-grade exams in constructing an overall performance measure. Sensitivity analysis was also
performed using equal weights on exams from all three grade levels. The results of the analysis are not highly sensitive to these weights.
See Duncombe (2002), appendix A, for a more detailed discussion of these measures.
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only basic competency for most students on the high
school exams. Taken literally, the new Regents stan-
dards imply a score close to 200, because students are
required to pass the Regents exams to receive a high
school diploma. Very few districts would presently
meet a standard of 200. A more realistic standard that
still might be consistent with the second CFE deci-
sion (CFE2) would be the present state average of 160.
Most districts in New York already meet this stan-
dard, but a standard of 160 would be a very ambi-
tious standard for many urban districts.
As indicated in figure 1, there are wide disparities in
student achievement across districts in New York State,
and these disparities are tied closely to school district
size and urbanization. The five large city school dis-
tricts have performance levels of approximately 100,
which is well below both the current state average and
our more modest standard of 130. Only 5 percent of
the districts don’t reach a standard of 130, but these
districts serve close to half the students in the state.
Most of the suburban districts and many rural dis-
tricts exceed the state average of 160.
Estimating the Cost of Adequacy
The heart of any adequacy-based finance system is
an estimate of the costs or spending required for each
district to reach a particular resource or performance
standard. This cost cannot be directly observed for a
low-performing district, so this step requires a
method to estimate the extent to which some dis-
tricts must pay more than others for the same perfor-
mance because of characteristics, such as student
poverty, that are outside their control. This calcula-
tion leads to a cost index, which can then be used to
determine how much money each district needs to
boost its student performance. This approach is analo-
gous to estimating and applying a cost-of-living in-
dex. If one location has a cost of living that is higher
than average, then people living in that location must
receive a higher income than people in the average
location in order to achieve the same standard of liv-
ing. Estimating a cost index is complicated, how-
ever, and several different approaches have been de-
veloped.5 In this paper, we focus on one method,
which is called the “cost function approach.”
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Figure 1.  Comparison of student performance index by New York region: 2000
SOURCE: New York State Education Department.
5 For a review of these methods, see Guthrie and Rothstein (1999) and Duncombe and Yinger (1999).
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The cost function approach uses statistical methods
to relate data on actual spending in school districts to
student performance, resource prices, student needs,
and other relevant district characteristics.6 The result-
ing estimates are used to construct an education cost
index, which measures how factors outside a district’s
control affect the spending required to reach a given
resource or student performance level. The cost func-
tion approach is well suited to developing estimates of
the cost of adequacy in individual districts, and the
results can be used directly in aid formulas.
These benefits are contingent, however, on the quality
of the data used in statistical analysis and the accuracy
of the statistical results. Any researcher estimating an
education cost function must make a
number of choices. Each of these
choices may affect the statistical re-
sults, in some cases significantly, and
some of these choices are not “trans-
parent” to policymakers and educa-
tors.7 The onus is on a researcher us-
ing the cost function approach to ex-
plain the method in an intuitive fash-
ion and to convince policymakers and
other policy analysts that reasonable
choices were made. In this section,
we discuss the choices we made in
applying the cost function approach
to New York.
The first step in the cost function
approach is to estimate a teacher cost index. As dis-
cussed below, a teacher cost index is sometimes used
on its own as a measure of resource cost differences
across school districts. In addition, however, a teacher
cost index plays a critical role in an analysis of total
educational costs, which must consider not only re-
source costs differences, but also differences in costs
that arise because of district size or the presence of
many disadvantaged students (also known as “at-risk”
students). We begin this section, therefore, by ex-
plaining how to estimate a teacher cost index and by
presenting teacher cost index results for New York.
We then turn to our method for estimating a full
education cost index, that is, for determining the re-
sources each district needs to provide a given quality
education given its resource costs, its enrollment, and
its concentration of at-risk students. The section ends
with a presentation of cost index results for New York
school districts.
Estimating a Teacher Wage Model and
a Teacher Cost Index
If a state’s adequacy standard requires that all dis-
tricts receive a minimum level of resources, then a
state aid program needs to make
some adjustment for the higher cost
of purchasing educational resources
in some school districts than oth-
ers. Because the primary resources
used by school districts are teachers
and other professional staff, adjust-
ing for differences in the cost of hir-
ing teachers is particularly impor-
tant.8 Such differences could arise for
several reasons. Specifically, some
districts may have to pay signifi-
cantly more than others to recruit
teachers of equal quality because of
a higher cost of living in the area,
strong competition from the private
sector for similar service-sector occupations, or more
difficult working conditions facing teachers. Not all
teachers consider the same factors in evaluating work-
ing conditions, but classroom discipline problems,
violence in schools, and a general lack of student mo-
tivation are likely to make a teaching job less attrac-
tive to most teachers.
In developing a teacher cost index, it is important to
distinguish between discretionary factors that a dis-
trict can influence, and labor market or working con-
6 For other examples of this approach, see Downes and Pogue (1994), Reschovsky and Imazeki (1997), and Duncombe and Yinger (2000).
7 The cost function approach has been criticized and ultimately rejected by some researchers, because its technical complexity makes it
difficult to explain to “reasonably well-educated policymakers” (Guthrie and Rothstein 1999, p. 223). In our view, this is an inappropriate
criterion for selecting a method for estimating the cost of adequacy, because simpler approaches, even if they are easier to explain, may be
grossly inaccurate. The main criteria in selecting a method should be accuracy, not transparency.
8 In principle, cost differences can also be calculated for other inputs, such as transportation, energy, and facilities, but this step is rarely
included in practice. For a good introduction to methods for calculating input cost differences, see Fowler and Monk (2001).
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dition factors that are outside a district’s control.9 Fac-
tors a district can influence include the experience and
education of its teaching force, the certification level
of its staff, the size of schools and classes, average stu-
dent performance, and the general level of efficiency
in the district. Factors outside a district’s control in-
clude labor market factors, such as private sector sala-
ries and unemployment rates, and factors related to
working conditions, such as a concentration of at-risk
students, juvenile crime rates, and pupil density. A
teacher cost index that is used to help compensate high-
need districts as part of a state aid system obviously
should only reflect factors that a district cannot con-
trol. As a result, a teacher wage model
accounts for factors influenced by a
district but does not consider them
in calculating the teacher cost index.
Using information on individual
teacher salaries and characteristics in
2000, along with school and district
characteristics, we estimate a teacher
wage model for New York State. The
sample size is over 120,000 full-
time classroom teachers, represent-
ing almost all the state’s districts.
The dependent variable is the
teacher’s salary, without fringe ben-
efits or compensation for extracur-
ricular activities.10 The model is estimated with stan-
dard linear regression techniques.11 The explanatory
variables include a wide range of teacher, school, and
district characteristics. The 2-year average share of
K–6 students eligible for a free lunch, for example,
is used as a measure of student poverty.12 A com-
plete list of the variables in the model is provided in
appendix table A-1.
The results for the teacher wage model are reported in
table 1. Looking first at teacher characteristics, most
of the variables are statistically significant and have
the expected sign. There is a positive relationship, for
example, between teacher salaries and total teaching
experience, whether the teacher has a graduate degree,
whether she teaches math or science, and the percent-
age of assignments in which she is certified to teach.
The two variables representing the
quality of the college the teacher at-
tended (as rated by U.S. News &
World Report) have the expected posi-
tive sign, but they are not statistically
significant.
Among the other discretionary fac-
tors, we found that working in a larger
school and having larger classes are
associated with higher wages, hold-
ing other factors constant, but the
class-size effect is not statistically sig-
nificant. Not surprisingly, we found
that the more resources that a dis-
trict has relative to its peer groups,
the higher the wages are.13 One unusual result is the
positive coefficient for the student outcome measure,
which implies that teachers require additional pay to
work with high-performing students. Another possi-
9 For a detailed discussion of the process of developing a teacher cost index and a cost of education index, see Chambers (1997).
1 0 Following many other studies, the teacher salary variable is specified as the natural logarithm of the observed salary.
1 1 Because the equation is estimated at the individual teacher level, it is reasonable to assume that teachers are price takers, that is, that they
cannot influence the salary schedule they face or the underlying personnel policies of the school district. Thus, endogeneity of some of the
independent variables is not likely to be a problem. However, the variables used in the model are from at least two different levels of
aggregation, the individual teacher and the school district. This implies that the standard errors from an ordinary least squares regression
(OLS) are biased, because the error terms are not independent across observations. In particular, the estimated standard errors on
district-level variables may significantly understate the actual standard errors. We use a well-known method to correct for this problem.
See Huber (1967) and White (1980). These corrections were made using the software package STATA, and clustering was assumed only
at the district level. There are three variables at the county level—professional wage, unemployment, and crime rate. It is possible that
the standard errors for these variables are underestimated. Finally, the model was initially estimated with a measure of high-cost special
needs students, but the coefficient was not found to be statistically significant. The final model was estimated without this variable.
1 2 One of the difficulties of estimating a “reduced form” teacher wage model is that variables, such as poverty, can pick up both working
condition differences and fiscal capacity differences across districts. The coefficient on the percent of free-lunch students was consistently
negative, suggesting that this variable is picking up fiscal capacity differences. To separate these two effects, we regressed the percent free-
lunch students on the natural log of per pupil income and property values, and used the residual in the regression as the measure of
poverty. This variable had the expected positive relationship with wages, holding other factors constant.
1 3 This is one of the so-called efficiency variables, which are discussed later in the paper.
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bility is that this variable is picking up fiscal capacity
differences across districts associated with unobserved
teacher quality.
Turning to the factors outside of district control, we
find that most of the variables fit expectations. More
urbanized districts pay higher wages, for example, as
do districts with higher private sector wages. The co-
efficient on the unemployment rate variable has the
expected negative sign; lower unemployment rates lead
to tighter labor markets and higher salaries. Salaries
are negatively related to the share of a county’s teach-
ers in a district, indicating that districts with relatively
large numbers of teachers may be more attractive to
teachers because they provide more options.14
We also find, as expected, that salaries are affected by
the working conditions in a district. To be specific,
1 4 Another interpretation for this variable is that it measures the ability of the district to exercise market power over wages. If the variable
is interpreted as a monopsony measure, then it would be a discretionary variable and would be held constant in constructing the teacher
wage index.
Table 1.  Results of the teacher wage model: 20001
Variables Coefficient t-statistics
Constant 7.84418 26.40
Teacher characteristics
Total experience2 0.21596 10.13
Master’s or higher 0.06403 2.51
Teacher of math/science 0.01261 6.00
Percent of assignments certified 0.03318 7.78
M.A. from top-rated school 0.00932 0.97
B.A. from top-rated school 0.00215 0.88
Factors under district control
School enrollment2 0.01827 4.50
Class size 0.00006 1.39
Aid efficiency variable3 0.59311 2.55
Income efficiency variable3 0.00000 5.00
Full value efficiency variable3 0.00000 0.45
Average student performance 0.00348 7.50
Factors outside district control
Labor market factors
Average unemployment rate (1997–99) –0.01626 –3.95
Pupil density2 0.03074 5.58
Professional wage2 0.14947 5.22
Share of county's teachers –0.16798 –3.00
Working condition factors
Average percent LEP4 students 0.43459 2.03
Adjusted free lunch student rate5 0.23406 5.38
Juvenile violent crime rate –45.71180 –3.72
District enrollment2 0.02708 2.50
Adjusted R-square 0.71400
1Estimated with ordinary least-squares regression, with standard errors adjusted for nonindependence using Huber (White)
method. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of teacher salaries. Sample size is 121,203.
2Expressed as natural logarithm.
3Calculated as the difference between district level and average level in peer group. See Duncombe (2002), appendix B.
4“LEP” means limited English proficient.
5Residual from a regression of the average (1999–2000) share of free lunch students in elementary school regressed on the log
of per pupil income and per pupil property values.
SOURCE: Calculations by authors.
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districts with higher shares of students with limited
English proficiency or receiving free lunch pay higher
salaries, holding other factors constant. Larger districts
(in terms of enrollment) are associated with higher sala-
ries, even controlling for school size and pupil den-
sity, suggesting that large district size may negatively
affect working conditions. One of the variables included
to measure working conditions, juvenile violent crime
rate, is negatively related to wages. Possible explana-
tions for this counterintuitive result include (1) teacher
quality has not been adequately controlled for, so that
this variable is picking up both working conditions
and lower teacher quality, and (2) the crime rate is
capturing omitted urbanization and fiscal capacity vari-
ables, and its coefficient reflects the fact that poorer
urban areas tend to have lower fiscal capacity. In ei-
ther case, the crime rate variable does not appear to be
reflecting differences in working conditions.
This teacher wage model can be used to develop a
measure of the underlying wage that a school district
must pay to attract teachers with a given set of charac-
teristics to a school district. As noted earlier, this pre-
dicted wage should only measure variation in factors
outside a school district’s control. Constructing the
predicted wage involves three steps: (1) multiplying
the regression coefficient associated with each discre-
tionary variable by the state average for that variable,
(2) multiplying the regression coefficient associated
with each variable outside a district’s control by the
actual value for that variable in each district, and
(3) summing for each district the results from the first
two steps to obtain the predicted wage.15 The teacher
wage index is then defined as the ratio of the predicted
wage for each district divided by the state average wage
and multiplied by 100.
Our teacher cost index for New York is reported in
figure 2. This index reveals a distinct difference in re-
source costs between upstate and downstate districts.
Most of the downstate districts have above-average
costs, and most of the upstate districts have below-
average costs. New York City and Yonkers, for example,
would have to pay over 50 percent more than the av-
1 5 Because the wage is expressed as a logarithm, the expected wage is the antilog of this sum.
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Figure 2.  Comparison of teacher cost indexes for New York regions: 1993, 2000
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erage district to attract similar teachers. These high
index values reflect both the high cost of living in
downstate New York and the challenging working en-
vironment in these two cities. Even though the other
large cities, commonly called the Big Three, are lo-
cated in upstate New York, where the cost of living is
below average, their working conditions are so diffi-
cult that they still would have to pay salaries 25 per-
cent higher than those in the average district to be
able to recruit teachers with similar characteristics.
Figure 2 also presents results for the 1993 teacher cost
index developed by Chambers (1997) for NCES.16 This
index shows the same general pattern
as our index, but its values for large
cities are significantly smaller. The
NCES index values for New York City
and Yonkers, for example, are only 10
to 25 percent higher than the state
average, and only 5 percent higher
than the state average for the upstate
large cities (the Big Three). Because
it is based on more detailed and more
recent data and is specific to New
York State, we believe that our index
provides more credible results than
the NCES index. To put it another
way, the significant differences be-
tween our teacher cost index and the
NCES index highlights the importance of careful state-
by-state analysis of factors affecting resource costs.
Estimating Cost Functions and Full
Cost Indexes
A standard foundation aid formula brings all districts
up to a minimum level of spending per pupil, but does
not ensure a minimum level of student performance. A
state adequacy standard that requires all districts to raise
their students to a given level of student performance
cannot be achieved, therefore, with a standard founda-
tion aid formula. Instead, the only way to ensure that
all districts have the resources they need to meet this
standard is to implement a foundation aid formula that
includes adjustments both for resource cost differences
across districts and for the higher level of resources re-
quired in some districts because of a concentration of
at-risk students and other factors outside their control.
The necessary adjustments can be determined by esti-
mating an education cost function and using the re-
sults to calculate an overall education cost index.
An education cost function relates per pupil spending
in a school district both to factors outside a district’s
control and to factors a district can influence. Only
the former factors are considered, however, in calcu-
lating an education cost index. The logic behind a cost
function begins with the observation that spending
levels in a district are clearly affected by the level of
student performance that school of-
ficials, and ultimately taxpayers, want
to support, a key factor inside the
district’s control. The cost function
we estimate, therefore, includes as an
explanatory variable the student per-
formance measure described earlier.
Because additional resources are gen-
erally required to raise student per-
formance, we expect a positive rela-
tionship between student perfor-
mance and spending, holding other
factors constant.
The relationship between spending
and performance has to be tempered
by the possibility of inefficiency in the use of resources,
another factor within a district’s control. Some school
districts may have high spending relative to their level
of student achievement not because of higher costs,
but because of inefficient use of resources. Moreover, a
cost model requires careful accounting for efficiency
differences across districts, because the results may
depend on which set of efficiency factors is included.
The literature on managerial efficiency and public bu-
reaucracies suggests three broad factors that might be
related to productive inefficiency: fiscal capacity, com-
petition, and factors affecting voter involvement in moni-
toring government (Leibenstein 1966; Niskanen 1971;
Wyckoff 1990; Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero 1997).
Research on New York school districts suggests incen-
tives for efficient use of resources may be lower in
1 6 The NCES index developed by Chambers (1997) is based on a regression model fit to national data on teachers, schools, and districts
from several NCES data sources, and other national data sources. While the basic structure of the teacher wage equation is similar, the
measures of teacher salary, teacher characteristics, and school district characteristics differ substantially from those used in this study.
A state adequacy
standard that requires
all districts to raise
their students to a
given level of student
performance cannot be
achieved with a stan-
dard foundation aid
formula.
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1 7 The categories include New York City, other large cities, high-need urban/suburban, high-need rural, average need, and low need. These
districts are classified based on a comparison of fiscal capacity (property values and income) and student needs (students receiving
reduced-price lunch, limited English proficient [LEP] students, and students in sparsely populated districts). New York City and the
other large cities were combined as one category. See New York State Education Department (2001), appendix, for a description of this
classification.
1 8 As before, this variable is expressed as a natural logarithm.
1 9 Expressed as a natural logarithm.
2 0 The cost model was estimated with two-stage least squares regression (2SLS), with instruments selected from characteristics of adjacent
school districts. We calculated the average, minimum, and maximum values of adjacent districts for a set of student characteristics,
performance levels, physical characteristics, and fiscal capacity measures. These potential instruments are then tested, and those that meet
the requirements of an instrument are used in the cost model. Instruments include the log of the pupil density, the average of LEP students
in adjacent districts, the maximum for income and performance on the grade 8 exams, and the minimum of performance on grade 8 exams
for adjacent districts. See Duncombe (2002), appendix B, for a detailed discussion of the process of selecting instruments.
wealthier or higher income districts, or those receiving
more state aid, because looser financial constraints di-
minish the incentive for taxpayers to put pressure on
their school districts (Duncombe and Yinger 2000).
Moreover, school officials have an incentive to compare
their school’s performance to that of similar districts
and will work hard to keep from falling behind other
districts at the same level of income or wealth. To mea-
sure the relative affluence of a district, we include the
difference between a district and the average in its peer
group for per pupil income, per pupil property values,
and state aid as a percent of district income. In this
context, a peer group is defined as one of the need/
resource-capacity categories defined by
SED, with the five large cities treated
as one peer group.17 We expect that
the higher a district’s resources rela-
tive to its peer group, the less efficient
the district will be and thus the more
it will spend, all else being equal.
The other variables in a cost function
are factors that are outside a district’s
control. These cost factors can be di-
vided into three categories, resource
prices, student needs, and the physi-
cal characteristics of the district. As dis-
cussed above, some districts may have
to pay significantly more to recruit
teachers of equal quality. The average salary for full-time
teachers with a graduate degree and 1 to 5 years of ex-
perience is used as the teacher salary measure.18 Factors
affecting students’ school readiness, motivation, and be-
havior influence not only the working conditions facing
a teacher, and hence competitive salaries, but also the
quantity of resources required to reach any given stu-
dent performance standard. We expect, for example, that
students whose native language is not English will re-
quire additional resources in the form of bilingual edu-
cation classes and other support to help them obtain
mastery of English and to stay on track in the curricu-
lum. The cost function in this study includes two stu-
dent need factors: the share of district enrollment that
consists of limited English proficient (LEP) students,
and the percentage of the district’s children between 5
and 17 years old living below the poverty line. Finally,
education costs may be affected by certain physical char-
acteristics of a district, including enrollment size and
physical terrain. Our cost model includes a set of vari-
ables indicating the enrollment level in the district to
reflect the fact that costs are likely to
be higher in very small school districts
(Duncombe and Yinger 2001b).
The dependent variable in the cost
model is per pupil operating expen-
diture for fiscal year 2000.19 The
sample size is 678 school districts.
Descriptive statistics for the variables
in the cost model are provided in
appendix table A-2. One technical
complexity arises in estimating this
model. Budget decisions involve
tradeoffs between desired student
performance levels, constraints on lo-
cal property tax rates, and decisions
over teacher salaries. In other words, spending levels,
performance targets, and teacher salaries are set simul-
taneously in the budget process, which implies that
the performance measure and teacher salaries are likely
to be endogenous and standard regression techniques
are likely to yield biased results. Consequently, we es-
timate the cost model with the appropriate simulta-
neous-equations procedure.20
We expect that the
higher a district’s
resources relative to its
peer group, the less
efficient the district will
be and thus the more it
will spend, all else being
equal.
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The cost model results are reported in table 2. In gen-
eral, the coefficients in the regression models have the
expected signs. The student performance variable has
a positive coefficient and is statistically significant, in-
dicating that higher performance requires more re-
sources. The precision of this coefficient is important,
because it is used in the adequacy calculations dis-
cussed below. As anticipated based on our analysis of
district inefficiency, the more resources a district has
relative to its peers, the higher its spending. Teacher
salaries are positively related to per pupil spending and
the salary coefficient is sensible; a 1 percent increase
in predicted salaries is associated with a 1 percent in-
crease in per pupil spending.
The results for student characteristics also follow ex-
pectations. As the proportion of poor students or LEP
students increases, the level of spending also increases,
controlling for performance. Both of these coefficients
are statistically significant at conventional levels. The
coefficient on the child poverty variable (LEP variable)
indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the child
poverty rate (share of LEP students) is associated with
a 0.98 (1.075) percent increase in per pupil spending,
all else being equal. Finally, the coefficients for the en-
rollment class variables indicate that, relative to very
small districts (under 1000 students), costs per pupil
are generally lower for most enrollment categories ex-
cept the largest (over 15,000 students). The coefficient
on the 1000-to-2000-student variable, for example,
indicates that these districts spend, on average, 9.3 per-
cent less than districts with fewer than 1000 students,
holding other variables constant. In other words, the
smallest districts have the highest costs.
Once an education cost function has been estimated,
an education cost index can be calculated in simple
steps. For each variable that a district can influence,
Table 2.  Results of the education cost models: 20001
Variables Coefficient t-statistics
Constant –2.58360 –2.29
Performance index 0.00752 3.57
Efficiency variables2
Full value 0.00000 10.55
Aid 1.12073 3.83
Income 0.00000 0.61
Average teacher salary3 0.99296 7.65
Percent child poverty (1997)4 0.97819 5.46
2-year average LEP5 students4 1.07514 2.30
Enrollment classes6
1,000–2,000 students –0.09342 –4.20
2,000–3,000 students –0.07956 –2.72
3,000–5,000 students –0.09500 –2.68
5,000–7,000 students –0.07944 –2.01
7,000–15,000 students –0.09579 –2.08
Over 15,000 students 0.05404 0.51
Adjusted R-square 0.493
1Estimated with linear two-stage least squares regression, with the student performance and teacher salaries treated as
endogenous. See Duncombe (2002), appendix B for discussion of instruments.
2Calculated as the difference between district value and the average in peer group. (See Duncombe 2002, appendix B.)
3For full-time teachers with 1 to 5 years of experience. Expressed as natural logarithm.
4Variables expressed as percent of enrollment.
5“LEP” means limited English proficient.
6The base enrollment is 0 to 1,000 students. The coefficients can be interpreted as the percent change in costs from being in this
enrollment class compared to the base enrollment class.
SOURCE: Calculations by authors.
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the estimated coefficient from the cost model is mul-
tiplied by some constant value for the variable, usu-
ally the state average, and these products are summed
across all such variables. This approach holds these vari-
ables constant across school districts; that is, it does
not allow factors inside a district’s control to influence
its relative educational costs. For each variable outside
a district’s control, the estimated coefficient from the
cost model is multiplied by the actual value for the
variable in each district. These products are then
summed across all such variables. The variation in these
variables across districts is, of course, the source of the
variation in the cost index. These two sums (based on
factors inside and outside a district’s control, respec-
tively) are then added, resulting in a prediction of the
amount each district must spend per pupil to obtain
an average performance level, assuming that it has the
efficiency level in the average district.
The final step is to transform this predicted spending
into an index. This step involves dividing predicted
spending in each district by predicted spending in a
district with average characteristics (including those
inside a district’s control) and then multiplying the
result by 100. This index reveals how much more or
less than the average district each district must spend
to achieve any given performance standard. An index
value of 200 indicates, for example, that a district must
spend twice as much as the average district to obtain
any given performance standard, whereas an index value
of 50 indicates that a district needs to spend only half
as much.
We also calculate a student need index, which has the
same form as the overall education cost index except
that it holds all factors at the state average except for
the poverty and LEP variables. A value of 150 for this
index, for example, indicates that a district must spend
50 percent more than the average district to achieve
any given performance standard simply because of the
high needs among its students (as measured by pov-
erty and LEP).
Figure 3 presents our education cost index and stu-
dent need index. The full cost index, which reflects
variation in both resource costs and student needs, has
a value of 183 for New York City, which indicates that
even if operating at an average efficiency level, New
York City would have to spend 83 percent more than
a district with average cost characteristics to reach the
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Figure 3.  Cost and student needs indexes for New York regions: 2000
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same level of student performance. In addition, child
poverty and LEP levels in New York City raise the
costs of achieving any adequacy target by 36 percent
compared to a district with average poverty and LEP
rates. This index also indicates that to reach the same
student performance level as the average district, Yon-
kers would have to spend almost 80 percent more per
pupil, and the upstate Big Three would have to spend
51 percent more per pupil. Moreover, student needs
alone have about the same impact on required spend-
ing for Yonkers and for the Big Three as they do for
New York City. The only other districts with costs
significantly above average are the “downstate small
cities,” which have to pay above-average teacher sala-
ries but do not have above-average student needs.
The typical approach for including student-need ad-
justment in aid formulas is to weight some students
more heavily than others in the distribution of aid. If
aid is distributed on a per pupil basis, then counting
some types of students twice, for example, will assure
that districts with these types of students receive more
resources. While most states use the weighted-pupil
approach to adjust for student needs, the origins of
most of these weights remain obscure. At best, some
are based on professional judgments about the extra
costs associated with certain types of students; others
appear to be ad hoc political compromises. Rarely are
pupil weights determined through careful analysis of
the actual relationship between student characteris-
tics and costs. This is unfortunate, because an educa-
tion cost model, such as the one estimated for this
paper, can be used to calculate these weights.
We now illustrate this principle by using our cost
model to calculate cost weights for both students in
poverty and LEP students. The first and third columns
of table 3 provide estimates of the extra costs associ-
ated with a student with certain characteristics in dif-
ferent types of districts. We find that each student in
poverty requires a district to spend between $7,000
and $9,000 in additional resources to maintain the
average performance level in the state. For LEP stu-
dents, the extra costs are even higher, namely, in ex-
cess of $10,000 per student.
Pupil weights are calculated by dividing these addi-
tional costs by the spending required to bring non-
LEP and poverty students up to average student per-
formance. The resulting weights are presented in the
second and fourth columns of table 3.21 For both types
of students the weights are approximately equal to 1.
A weight of 1 can be interpreted as indicating that it
is twice as expensive to bring a student of this type up
to any given performance level as it is to bring other
types of students up to that performance level. While
there exists no definitive list of the pupil weights used
by various states, the available evidence suggests that
weights of 0.5 or below for at-risk students are the
norm (Alexander and Salmon 1995, table 9.2). Our
results indicate that the typical weight is far too low
for New York State.
2 1 See Duncombe (2002), appendix B, for a discussion of the methodology used to calculate pupil weights from cost function results.
Table 3.  Cost impact of student needs: 1999–2000*
Extra cost per Extra cost per
child in poverty Child poverty LEP student LEP student
Regions (in dollars) weight (in dollars) weight
Downstate small cities 8,002 0.98 10,571 1.13
Downstate suburbs 7,941 0.98 10,343 1.10
New York City 7,945 0.98 10,762 1.15
Yonkers 7,606 0.94 11,008 1.18
The Big Three (upstate) 8,985 1.10 10,440 1.12
Upstate rural 8,086 0.99 10,170 1.09
Upstate small cities 7,715 0.95 10,260 1.10
Upstate suburbs 7,951 0.98 10,129 1.08
*Pupil weight is defined as the percent increase in costs associated with a student of a certain type. For example, the limited
English proficient (LEP) student weight in New York City is 1.15. This indicates that bringing a typical LEP student in NYC up to an
average performance level (160) will cost 115 percent more than a non-LEP student with otherwise similar characteristics.
SOURCE: Calculations by authors.
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Estimating the Cost of Adequacy
The bottom line in developing a school finance sys-
tem to support adequacy is determining what it will
cost in each school district to reach the adequacy stan-
dard (assuming average efficiency). As explained ear-
lier, we consider student performance standards of 130
and 160 to illustrate the effects of different adequacy
standards on costs. For each performance standard, we
first use our cost model to calculate the per pupil spend-
ing required to reach the standard in a district with
average characteristics. This required per pupil spend-
ing in the average district is then multiplied by the
cost index (divided by 100) to estimate the cost of
adequacy in other districts.
To estimate the cost of adequacy with
a resource standard, one must select
a minimum bundle of resources and
then estimate its cost. One technique
for carrying out these steps is com-
monly called the “resource cost
model” (RCM), which is a “bottom-
up” approach to estimating the cost
of adequacy (Chambers and Parish
1982; Management Analysis 1997).
The RCM method involves design-
ing prototypical classrooms, schools,
and districts by asking professional
educators what resources are required
for a school to meet a particular stan-
dard. These resources are multiplied by resource prices
to estimate the cost of resource adequacy in a proto-
typical district. The cost in the prototypical district is
then multiplied by the resource cost index to estimate
adequacy costs for other districts. For simplicity, we
use the cost of adequacy in a district with average char-
acteristics to identify a prototypical district’s cost, in-
stead of identifying a bundle of resources and deter-
mining its cost. We then multiply the spending re-
quired in this district by different resource cost in-
dexes rather than by the full cost index.
Table 4 provides estimates of the per pupil spending
required to reach different adequacy standards using
different cost indexes for New York school districts.
Comparisons are made to actual per pupil expendi-
tures in the 1999–2000 fiscal year. As expected, we
find that estimated required spending levels depend
heavily on which standard and which cost index are
used. With a standard of 130 and the teacher cost
index produced for this study (New York teacher cost
index), achieving adequacy requires significant in-
creases over actual spending only in New York City
and the large upstate cities (top panel of table 4).22
Using the NCES teacher cost index, actual spending
in New York City is estimated to already be adequate
to reach a standard of 130. Using the 130 standard
and a full cost index, which adjusts for resource prices
and student needs, adequacy cannot be achieved with-
out significant spending increases in all the large cit-
ies. We estimate, for example, that
per pupil spending in New York City
would have to increase by 56 percent,
from $8,823 to $13,758.
If the more ambitious 160 standard is
selected, then spending increases
would be required in New York City
and the upstate Big Three using any
cost index. Using the NCES index,
modest spending increases would have
to occur in all the large cities except
Yonkers and in the downstate small
cities. When either the teacher cost
index or the full cost index developed
for this study is used, however, achiev-
ing adequacy would require sizeable spending increases
in all the large cities and downstate small cities. Using
the full cost index, for example, we estimate that spending
would have to double in New York City, increase by 35
percent in Yonkers, and increase by 53 percent in the
large upstate cities (the Big Three). Clearly, the level of
the standard and the type of adjustment for cost differ-
ences across districts can have a large impact on the
estimated costs of reaching an adequacy standard.
State Aid Formulas to Fund Adequacy
Basic operating aid formulas should be designed pri-
marily to assist state governments in accomplishing
their educational equity objectives. In most states,
school districts differ widely in property wealth, in-
come, resource prices, and student needs, and these
2 2 Because regional averages are presented, the results in table 4 obscure the fact that some districts in other regions are estimated to require
significant spending increases to reach the adequacy standard.
With a standard of 130 and
the teacher cost index
produced for this study
(New York teacher cost
index), achieving adequacy
requires significant
increases over actual
spending only in New York
City and the large upstate
cities.
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differences can lead to equally large differences in stu-
dent performance. Most states have long recognized
that variation in fiscal capacity can play an important
role in creating large disparities in spending and stu-
dent performance across districts. The equally signifi-
cant impact on student performance of variation in
resource costs and student needs has received far less
attention. Educational cost indexes are important
largely because they make it possible to design school
aid formulas that effectively target resources to dis-
tricts with the highest costs and greatest student needs.
This section will illustrate how a cost index can be
used in conjunction with fiscal capacity measures to
develop simple but effective operating aid formulas for
funding adequacy standards.23
Designing a Cost-Adjusted
Foundation Formula
The majority of states use some form of a foundation
grant system, which is designed to ensure that all dis-
tricts meet some minimal standard.24 For the most part,
however, these systems express their standard in terms
of spending, not student performance, so they do not
bring the most disadvantaged districts up to a reason-
able performance standard. In other words, these sys-
2 3 This section draws heavily from Ladd and Yinger (1994), and Duncombe and Yinger (1998, 2000).
2 4 For the most recent compilation of school finance systems, see U.S. Department of Education (2001).
Standard of 130
Standard of 160
Table 4.  Required spending per pupil for adequacy for different cost indexes*
1999–2000 New York NCES New York full cost
per pupil teacher cost teacher cost index (2000)
 Regions expenditure  index (2000) index (1993)  (all cost factors)
In dollars
State average (per pupil) 9,781 7,606 7,606 7,606
Downstate small cities 10,400 9,765 9,458 10,502
Downstate suburbs 11,723 8,642 9,038 8,573
New York City 8,823 11,701 8,597 13,758
Yonkers 12,437 11,569 9,430 13,384
The Big Three (upstate) 9,289 9,627 7,990 11,372
Upstate rural 9,509 6,842 6,693 7,181
Upstate small cities 9,335 7,902 7,357 8,054
Upstate suburbs 8,307 7,361 7,348 7,028
2000 average New York NCES New York full cost
performance teacher cost  teacher cost index (2000)
index  index (2000) index (1993) (all cost factors)
In dollars
State average (per pupil) 160 9,532 9,532 9,532
Downstate small cities 148 12,236 11,852 13,161
Downstate suburbs 169 10,829 11,326 10,774
New York City 103 14,663 10,773 17,241
Yonkers 107 14,497 11,817 16,772
The Big Three (upstate) 96 12,036 10,012 14,251
Upstate rural 156 8,574 8,387 8,999
Upstate small cities 145 9,903 9,220 10,093
Upstate suburbs 160 9,224 9,208 8,808
*Calculated by estimating the cost in district with average cost to reach the given standard multiplied by the cost index (divided
by 100).
NOTE: Large city districts are shaded.
SOURCE: Calculations by authors.
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tems are not consistent with the current focus on mini-
mum adequacy standards for student performance.
In designing a traditional foundation formula, a state
government needs to set a statewide minimum level
of spending (E*) and the minimum amount of local
effort. The latter is often defined in terms of a state-
determined minimum local property tax rate (t*) .
The amount of revenue raised at this rate depends
on the actual property values per pupil in a school
district (V
i 
). Once these are defined, the per pupil
aid (Ai ) received by a district is simply the difference
between the minimum spending level and the sum
of the revenue raised by the district
at the minimum local effort.25 In
short,
Ai = E
* - t*Vi .
While the minimum spending level
is constant statewide, the amount
raised at the minimum level of local
effort will vary across districts in di-
rect proportion to their fiscal capac-
ity. Thus, a foundation formula ex-
pects wealthier districts to contrib-
ute more taxes per pupil than poorer
districts. If the traditional foundation
formula is to successfully bring dis-
tricts up to the minimum spending level, then a mini-
mum level of local effort must be enforced; that is, no
district should be allowed to levy a tax rate below t*.
Taken literally, this formula also could lead to “nega-
tive aid” or “recapture” of local property taxes in
wealthy districts. In practice, however, the minimum
aid amount is usually set to zero, and we use this aid
design in the rest of our analysis.26
A traditional foundation formula with a minimum-
tax-rate requirement should be successful in bringing
spending in all districts up to the desired minimum
level. However, the same minimum spending will be
much more successful in raising student performance
in some districts than in other districts, due in part to
factors outside a district’s control. Thus, a traditional
foundation formula will generally not be successful in
raising student performance in all districts up to an
adequate performance level unless the minimum spend-
ing level is set very high, and the performance adequacy
standard is set very low.
To convert a traditional foundation formula into a
cost-adjusted foundation formula requires the basic tools
that have been developed in this study.27 First, the
state must select an adequacy stan-
dard defined as a minimum level ei-
ther of resources or of student per-
formance, not simply of spending.
Second, the adequacy standard must
be converted into the spending re-
quired to meet the adequacy stan-
dard, an amount that obviously var-
ies across districts because of varia-
tions in costs. One approach to these
two steps is, of course, developed in
this paper. Specifically, we estimate
the cost of adequacy by multiplying
the spending required in the district
with average cost characteristics by
a cost index. For a resource adequacy
standard, the cost index reflects differences in the re-
source costs across the state that arise because higher
salaries must be paid to attract teachers in some dis-
tricts than in others. For a performance adequacy stan-
dard, the cost index captures both variation in re-
source prices and the greater quantity of inputs re-
quired in some districts because of higher student
needs.
These steps make it possible to define cost-adjusted
foundation aid per pupil, which is the difference be-
tween the spending per pupil necessary to reach the
2 5 Some states consider other local revenue sources or certain types of federal aid as part of the local contribution. To minimize the required
state aid, we counted all federal aid as part of the local effort.
2 6 A few states have turned the local property tax into a state tax, which is an indirect way to include recapture in a foundation formula.
2 7 This could also be called a performance-based foundation when the cost adjustment is for resource costs, sparsity, and student needs (our
full cost index). The aid formula with full cost adjustment is designed to provide adequate resources for a district to have the opportunity
to reach a particular performance standard (Duncombe and Yinger 2000). We have used the more general term, cost-adjusted foundation,
to reflect either resource cost adjustment or full cost adjustment.
A traditional foundation
formula will generally not
raise student performance
in all districts up to an
adequate level unless the
minimum spending level is
very high and the perfor-
mance adequacy standard
is very low.
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adequacy standard in a given district and the amount
raised in the district by the minimum local tax effort
and federal aid:
Ai = E
*ci  – t
*Vi ,
where E* is required spending in the district with av-
erage characteristics, and ci is an education cost index
(centered on the district with average characteristics).
The cost of adequacy calculated previously is repre-
sented by E*ci .
This cost-adjusted foundation formula is simple
enough to be transparent to most
school personnel and to the average
voter; the logic of adjusting for costs
is compelling and easy to understand.
Moreover, the available evidence in-
dicates that it would be effective.
Duncombe and Yinger (1998) tested
a number of aid formulas using New
York data to determine which ones
are the most effective in accomplish-
ing specific educational equity objec-
tives. They conclude:
Our simulations of the impacts
of . . . outcome-based [founda-
tion] plans indicate that such
plans can be an effective tool for promoting
educational adequacy, at least when they in-
clude a required minimum tax rate. Indeed,
by requiring contributions from local taxpay-
ers, these plans can bring the vast majority of
districts up to any standard policymakers se-
lect. The districts that remain below the stan-
dard are relatively inefficient. (p. 258)
As with a traditional foundation formula, the success
of a cost-adjusted foundation aid formula in signifi-
cantly raising resources and student performance de-
pends on enforcing a minimum-local-tax-rate provi-
sion and on the efficiency with which needy school
districts use the additional resources.
Example of Aid Distribution With a
Cost-Adjusted Foundation System
To illustrate a cost-adjusted foundation formula, we
use the estimates of spending required to reach par-
ticular adequacy standards in table 4. In addition, we
impose a minimum local effort equivalent to a prop-
erty tax rate of $15 per $1,000 of market value, which
is equal to the 1999–2000 state average.28
By design, a cost-adjusted foundation focuses aid on
districts that face the most severe constraints in reach-
ing the performance standard. However, table 5 makes
it clear that the distribution of aid
across districts depends significantly
on the standard chosen and the type
of cost adjustment made. This table
compares the current aid distribution
with aid that is distributed entirely
through a cost-adjusted foundation
formula. With a standard of 130 and
the NCES teacher cost index, switch-
ing to a cost-adjusted foundation pro-
gram would actually cut aid by over
$2 billion, and even the large cities
would receive little, if any, aid in-
creases. In contrast, using the
teacher cost index developed in this
study would raise aid by $3 billion,
and would result in large aid in-
creases in the large cities. A cost-adjusted founda-
tion aid program based on the full cost index devel-
oped in this study would result in an increase in the
overall aid budget of $6 billion, substantial aid in-
creases in the large cities, and significant aid cuts in
many downstate districts and in rural districts.
Not surprisingly, the results for a performance stan-
dard at the current state average of 160 are more dra-
matic. In this case, switching to a cost-adjusted foun-
dation aid program would result in substantial aid in-
creases for the large cities using any cost index. Aid
increases in New York City would range from about
$2,000 per pupil (a 52 percent increase) with the
NCES teacher cost index, to $8,500 per pupil (a 215
2 8 Although this minimum effort is expressed as a property tax rate, the revenue could be raised through some other source, such as a local
income tax. In this case, the local property tax rate would not have to be this high.
Such a cost-adjusted
foundation aid pro-
gram would result in
an increase of $6
billion, substantial aid
increases in the larger
cities, and significant
aid cuts in many
downstate districts
and rural districts.
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percent increase) with the full cost index developed
for this study. Aid increases would be even higher in
Yonkers and would range from 18 percent to 91 per-
cent in the other large cities. If one of the cost indexes
developed in this study is used, aid increases would
also occur in many small city districts. The significant
aid increases in large urban districts would be financed
from two sources: aid reductions, particularly in some
rural and suburban districts, and large increases in state
aid budgets (assuming minimum local effort is kept at
the current state average of $15 per $1,000). For a
standard of 160, the aid budget would increase
between $4.1 billion (37 percent) and $11 billion
(101 percent), depending on the cost index used.
Policy Choices in Financing an
Adequate Education
Our estimates of the cost of achieving adequacy imply
that adequacy cannot be achieved in New York with-
out dramatic changes in the state’s school finance sys-
tem. In particular, spending levels in the high-need
urban districts would have to rise significantly to pro-
vide the resources these districts need to bring their
Standard of 130
Standard of 160
Table 5.  Distribution of cost-adjusted foundation aid for different cost indexes1
2000–2001 New York NCES New York full cost
per pupil teacher cost teacher cost index (2000)
Regions school aid 2 index (2000) index (1993) (all cost factors)
Total aid budget
    (in millions of dollars) 11,145 13,332 9,702 15,458
In dollars
State average (per pupil) 4,053 2,856 2,784 2,836
Downstate small cities 3,205 2,291 1,971 2,828
Downstate suburbs 2,419 1,312 1,531 1,204
New York City 3,949 6,922 3,817 8,979
Yonkers 3,112 5,837 3,697 7,652
The Big Three (upstate) 5,835 6,516 4,879 8,261
Upstate rural 5,203 3,099 2,877 3,397
Upstate small cities 4,937 4,321 3,800 4,496
Upstate suburbs 4,031 3,365 3,358 3,039
New York NCES New York full cost
teacher cost teacher cost index (2000)
index (2000) index (1993) (all cost factors)
Total aid budget (in millions of dollars) 19,762 15,223 22,395
In dollars
State average (per pupil) 4,448 4,440 4,397
Downstate small cities 4,340 3,887 5,145
Downstate suburbs 2,505 2,834 2,334
New York City 9,884 5,993 12,462
Yonkers 8,765 6,084 11,040
The Big Three (upstate) 8,953 6,901 11,140
Upstate rural 4,680 4,351 5,066
Upstate small cities 6,289 5,626 6,497
Upstate suburbs 5,133 5,108 4,716
1Cost-adjusted foundation aid is calculated by taking the estimated per pupil spending to reach the standard, and subtracting
from it the required minimum local tax contribution (1.5 percent of property values) and federal aid. If the calculated aid is
negative, it is set equal to 0.
2Includes all formula aid except Building Aid, Transportation Aid, and Reorganization Building Aid.  Based on estimates of aid
distribution in May 2001.
NOTE: Large city districts are shaded.
SOURCE: Calculations by authors.
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students up to any reasonable standard. Part of that
required spending increase would cover higher teacher
salaries so that these districts could compete with their
suburbs for the best teachers. In addition, this required
spending increase could fund class-size reductions,
additional staff to support intense instruction in read-
ing and math, and programs to address the social and
health needs of at-risk children. When interpreting
these large required spending increases, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that reaching the current state-
wide student average performance (160) in New York
would require raising student performance in New
York’s large cities to levels that have seldom been
achieved in large cities anywhere in the nation.
This study has presented estimates of
the spending required for a district
to have the opportunity to reach an
adequacy standard. Another central
policy question is how this spending
should be financed. To answer this
question, that is, to design a school
finance system, state policymakers
must address two key issues: the rela-
tive contributions of state and local
governments and the impact of aid
changes on school district efficiency.
State Versus Local
Contribution to School
Funding
The amount of state aid required to support an ad-
equacy objective is directly related to two key policy
decisions: how high to set the standard and how high
to set the minimum local contribution. The advan-
tage of a simple aid formula, such as the cost-adjusted
foundation, is that it makes clear the impact of these
two decisions on the required state aid budget. With
any reasonable minimum local tax effort, the state aid
budget would have to increase significantly to finance
the adequacy standards presented in this report, and
the only way to lower the required state aid budget for
a given standard is to raise the required local tax effort.
This analysis requires the state to enforce the mini-
mum local tax effort as a legal requirement for receiv-
ing state aid. Otherwise, financially strapped districts,
such as the large cities, will be tempted to cut local
school tax rates and siphon state school aid into other
services or tax cuts.29 This type of behavior obviously
undermines an adequacy standard.
Before making a decision about the required minimum
local tax effort, a state needs to consider several issues.
The first issue is that there are some good arguments
for keeping local property taxes low. While a well-ad-
ministered property tax is not as regressive as is com-
monly believed, it can impose a significant burden on
some low-income households. More-
over, a substantial property tax in-
crease may undermine the competi-
tiveness of a community, particularly
a large city, in attracting or retaining
residents and business. In our simu-
lations, some of the largest required
local tax increases would be in Buf-
falo and Syracuse and other upstate
cities, which have experienced little
economic growth in the last decade.
Some states have tried to minimize
the burden of local property taxes
without increasing state education
aid by passing a property tax relief
program, such as a homestead exemption. These pro-
grams help to ease the property tax burden on
homeowners, but they often do not help renters or
businesses. Moreover, these programs do not focus tax
relief (and the state funds that support it) on
homeowners in the school districts that need help the
most. If a state is concerned about school finance eq-
uity, it should keep local property taxes low by in-
creasing state aid to education, not by implementing
direct property tax relief programs (Duncombe and
Yinger 2001a).
An alternative to enforcing a minimum-tax-effort re-
quirement is to use matching grants for operating aid.
2 9 For a good review of the evidence on local tax effort in New York, where no minimum local effort is required, see New York State
Education Department (2000). The study shows that several of the large upstate cities, Buffalo and Syracuse, used most of the school aid
increases in the 1990s to lower school taxes rather than improve education.
The minimum local tax
effort must be a legal
requirement for receiving
state aid. Otherwise,
financially strapped
districts, such as the large
cities, will be tempted to
cut local school tax rates
and siphon state school
aid into other services or
tax cuts.
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A matching grant can be adjusted for fiscal capacity
and educational costs, so that the state matching rate
will be much higher in large cities and other high-
need districts. These high matching rates are designed
to encourage local spending on schools without re-
quiring any particular local contribution. There is no
guarantee, however, that high-need districts will sig-
nificantly increase local tax effort in response to such a
grant, let alone that they will increase local effort
enough to achieve an adequate performance, however
defined. In fact, a recent analysis using New York data
shows that for any given state aid budget, even well-
designed matching grants will not be as effective as
cost-adjusted foundation grants in reaching an ad-
equacy standard (Duncombe and Yinger 1998). While
enforcing a minimum-local-effort
provision may be politically unpopu-
lar with some local officials, it is a more
cost-effective strategy than a match-
ing grant for assuring adequate edu-
cational performance.
A final issue that arises in deciding
on the state’s share of education
spending is that any increase in this
share may lower productive efficiency
in school districts. Indeed, some re-
cent research based on New York data
finds evidence supporting this possi-
bility (Duncombe and Yinger 2000).
This effect could arise, for example,
because citizens are more apt to put pressure on school
boards and superintendents, and thereby keep school
districts efficient, when they must finance education
through local taxes than when money for education is
provided from state aid. A substantial increase in state
aid to high-need districts could increase inefficiency
by (1) putting pressure on already strained teacher
labor markets; (2) encouraging rapid expansion of
teacher salaries without accountability; (3) raising lo-
cal construction costs through a large building pro-
gram; and (4) straining the capability of district per-
sonnel to efficiently manage finances, to monitor pri-
vate contracts, and to evaluate the success of existing
or new programs.
These efficiency effects are not so large that they elimi-
nate the benefits of higher state aid to school districts,
but they do indicate that some of the benefits of state
aid “leak out” in the form of higher inefficiency. As a
result, states should be leery of setting the required
minimum local tax effort too low.
Improve School Efficiency
An alternative approach to the issue of school district
efficiency is to devise policies that boost school dis-
trict efficiency directly, and thereby offset to some
degree the efficiency-lowering effects of increased state
aid. This approach is appealing, because it allows a
state to minimize the required local tax effort for any
given state aid budget (or to minimize state aid at any
given required local tax effort), but it is also risky, be-
cause the impacts of direct policies to boost school
district efficiency appear to be mod-
est but are not well understood. In-
deed, it is highly unlikely that any
policies currently known could gen-
erate efficiency improvements suffi-
cient to raise low-performing districts
up to a reasonable adequacy standard.
Nevertheless, these policies have the
potential to make a significant posi-
tive contribution to a state education
finance system, and in particular, to
help high-need districts cope with
large aid increases, and they are clearly
worthy of more investigation.
Among the policies that appear most
promising is technical assistance provided by a state
education department on a variety of topics, including
■ personnel functions, such as planning and fore-
casting future staffing needs, teacher recruitment
and retention policies, and teacher evaluation
methods, etc.;
■ the use of program evaluation methods and stu-
dent performance data to help guide program
decisions made by school districts;
■ the development of long-range capital plans, and
evaluation of alternative capital financing options;
and
■ financial management practices, such as the use
of cost accounting techniques, and school-based
budgeting.
A substantial increase
in state aid to high-
need districts could
increase inefficiency.
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Another set of promising policies concerns the train-
ing of school district administrators. The recent selec-
tion of superintendents from noneducation back-
grounds by some large-city districts may reflect in part
the lack of training in basic management functions in
many educational administration programs. State edu-
cation departments can help shape the training that
education administrators receive through both certifi-
cation requirements and promoting innovative educa-
tion management programs. While state governments
may be loath to expand state education departments,
particularly during an era of declining revenues, as-
sisting districts to improve their management capac-
ity may require an expanded staff and a diversification
of specializations within these departments. In some
cases, investing in increased capacity in state educa-
tion departments to provide technical assistance in
school management and improved administrator train-
ing programs may do as much to promote an adequacy
standard as investing in higher state aid.
Conclusions
The trend toward higher student performance stan-
dards, which is backed by elected officials, education
departments, and courts in many states, is clearly here
to stay. It is time for state education finance systems
to catch up, and in particular, to implement state aid
systems that explicitly recognize that some districts
must spend more than others to achieve any given per-
formance standard.
The objective of this study is to assist state govern-
ments in developing this type of education finance sys-
tem. In particular, we explain that an adequacy-based
finance system involves three components. First, states
must clearly define the type and level of the adequacy
standard. They must decide, for example, whether to
focus on resource adequacy or performance adequacy.
As illustrated in the CFE decisions in New York, the
distinction between these two types of standards is
not always clarified by the courts; nevertheless, this
distinction is crucial because it determines whether
the state aid system must make adjustments for cross-
district differences in student needs.
Second, a state government must estimate the spend-
ing required to reach adequacy in each district. This
step is consistent with the court decisions in most states,
which focus on resource or performance standards, not
spending. This estimated cost of adequacy varies across
districts in line with education costs. We illustrate the
use of two statistical models, namely, a teacher wage
equation and an education cost function, to develop
education cost indexes. These indexes play a crucial
role in estimating the cost of adequacy by measuring
differences in resource costs and student needs across
school districts. Using New York as a case study, we
illustrate how the estimated cost of adequacy, particu-
larly in large cities, is affected by choices about the
stringency of the adequacy standard and the cost in-
dex. Given the importance of cost adjustments to esti-
mating the cost of adequacy, all state governments
would be well advised to support research on educa-
tional costs in their state and how these costs vary
across districts.
Third, a state must develop a state aid formula that
focuses aid on the districts with the highest costs and
the lowest fiscal capacities. In New York, these dis-
tricts include the large cities, which also have some of
the lowest levels of student performance in the state. A
simple modification of a traditional foundation formula
to incorporate the estimated cost of adequacy provides
a simple, but powerful aid system for reaching an ad-
equacy standard. The simplicity of this formula helps
to focus attention on the key questions in designing a
school finance system: What is the adequacy standard?
How should costs be accounted for? What should be
the state share of educational spending?
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Table A-1.  Variables in a teacher wage equation
Standard
Variable name Variable description Source Level Mean1 deviation1
Dependent variable:
Lnsalary Natural log of basic salary (no fringes or extra pay) PMF teacher 10.82305 0.30820
Discretionary factors
Teacher quality measures:
Lexper Log of total teaching experience PMF teacher 2.38441 0.97610
Gradsch 1 if have Ph.D. or M.A. PMF teacher 0.74533 0.43568
Mathsci 1 if major assignment is in math or science PMF teacher 0.14258 0.34108
Sumcert Share of assignments teacher has permanent
certification. PMF teacher 0.88374 0.30213
MA_USN 1 if M.A. college is in U.S. News 1st tier TCERT/U.S. News teacher 0.03037 0.17161
BA_USN 1 if B.A. college is in U.S. News 1st tier TCERT/U.S. News teacher 0.04543 0.20824
Working condition measures:
Lschenr Log of enrollment in school where teacher teaches IMF school 6.61511 0.63250
Clsize Average class size for teacher's assignments PMF teacher 23.75623 19.49249
Outcomes Average district student performance SED district 141.52944 30.97875
Efficiency measures:2
Aiddif Difference in aid per dollar of income in this district
and average district in similar need-capacity category State aid district –0.01208 0.02283
Fvdif Difference in per pupil property value in this district
and average district in similar need-capacity category State aid district 13845 65578
Incdif Difference in per pupil income in this district and
average district in similar need-capacity category State aid district –49726 251518
Factors outside district control
Labor market variables:
Lprofwage Log of average county payroll for professional,
scientific and technical sector (1997) Census county 10.59301 0.35579
Avgunemp Average unemployment rate (1997–1999) BLS county 4.63639 1.44679
Tchshare District share of county's full-time teachers IMF district 0.41629 0.34830
Working condition variables:
Lpupden Log of enrollment per square mile IMF district 5.83664 1.96455
Ldisenr Log of district enrollment (average enrollment) IMF district 9.85490 2.65105
Flunres3 Adjusted 2-year average of percent K–6
enrollment receiving free lunch (1999–2000) SED district –0.03499 0.26970
Avglep 2-year average of percent LEP4 students (1999–2000) SED district 0.05142 0.05515
Crrate2 Violent crime rate for juveniles (under 18 years old)
per 100,000 people (1998) FBI county 0.00275 0.00199
1Average of values associated with individual teachers. Sample size is 121,203. For county- or district-level variables, this is
equivalent to a weighted average, weighted by the relative number of teachers. All data are for 2000 (or the 1999–2000 school
year or fiscal year) unless otherwise noted.
2Need-capacity categories are defined by the New York State Education Department based on property, wealth, and student
characteristics in the district.
3Residual from a regression of the average (1999–2000) share of free lunch students in elementary school regressed on the log of
per pupil income and per pupil property values.
4“LEP” means limited English proficient.
SOURCE: PMF = New York State Education Department Personnel Master File; TCERT = New York State Education Department
teacher certification data base; IMF = New York State Education Department Institutional Master File; State aid = New York State
Education Department state aid files; Census = U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997 Economic Census for Service Industries; BLS = U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics; U.S. News = U.S. News & World Report rankings of undergraduate
colleges; FBI = U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Uniform Crime Reporting system; and SED = Provided directly by New York State
Education Department staff.
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Table A-2.  Descriptive statistics for variables in cost model: 1999–2000
Variables Mean Standard deviation
Per pupil spending1 9.106 0.231
Performance index 159.43 17.58
Efficiency variables2
Full value 0.00000 623613
Aid 0.00000 0.02723
Income 0.00000 73010
Average teacher salary3 10.5137 0.1342
Percent child poverty (1997)4 0.1580 0.0978
2-year average LEP5 students4 0.0129 0.0307
Enrollment classes6
1,000–2,000 students 0.3201 0.4668
2,000–3,000 students 0.1608 0.3676
3,000–5,000 students 0.1431 0.3504
5,000–7,000 students 0.0605 0.2385
7,000–15,000 students 0.0516 0.2214
Over 15,000 students 0.0103 0.1012
Downstate small city or suburb 0.2589 0.4383
1Total spending without transportation, debt services, or tuition payments for students in private placements. Sample size is 678
school districts.
2Calculated as the difference between district value and the average in peer group.  See text for discussion of peer group.
3For full-time teachers with 1 to 5 years of experience.  Expressed as natural logarithm.
4Variables expressed as a percent of enrollment.
5"LEP" means limited English proficient.
6The base enrollment is 0 to 1,000 students.  Variable equals 1 if district is this size, or else it equals 0.
SOURCE: Calculations by authors.
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